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INTRODUCTION 
The claim in vogue is that Legal Realism stands for “the insignificance 
of doctrine”1 and its conceptualization as a “mere appearance[].”2 In particular, 
commentators associate Realism with a “nominalist impulse”3 that minimizes 
the significance of doctrinal categories. Against this conventional wisdom 
stands the resilience of doctrinal analysis in general and, in particular, the 
continued role of doctrinal categories in legal practice and discourse, which 
 
† Stewart and Judy Colton Professor of Legal Theory and Innovation, Tel-Aviv University 
Buchmann Faculty of Law. Thanks to Brian Bix, Avihay Dorfman, Craig Green, Larissa Katz, Leo 
Katz, Greg Keating, Roy Kreitner, Rick Pildes, Henry Smith, Steve Smith, Alex Stein, and Ben 
Zipursky for their helpful comments. 
1 John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 
1643 (2012); see also John H. Langbein, The Later History of Restitution (arguing that Legal Realists 
understand doctrine as “a smokescreen for the policies, politics, values, social forces, or whatever, 
that really motivate the decisions. . . . ”), in RESTITUTION PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE: 
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF GARETH JONES 57, 62 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., 1998). 
2 Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1645. 
3 Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2128 
(2012); see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 15-16 (1978) (describing Legal 
Realism as nominalism). 
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is puzzling given the substantial impact of Realism on legal education. This 
puzzle is the focus of our Symposium.  
I argue that this puzzle is solved by discarding these conventional readings 
of Legal Realism and adopting, in their stead, a more accurate understanding 
of the realist legacy.4 Charitably interpreted, Legal Realism stands for the 
conception of law as a going institution (or set of institutions) distinguished 
by the difficult accommodation of three constitutive yet irresolvable  
tensions: power and reason, science and craft, and tradition and progress. 
This interpretation of Legal Realism, I contend, explains both why doctrinal 
categories (like other aspects of Doctrinalism) typify the daily life of the 
practice of law, and why they do not—and, neither can nor should—exhaust 
our understanding of law. Thus, rather than ignoring doctrine and doctrinal 
categories, Realism refines and delimits their proper functions and modes of 
helpful operation.  
Realists argue that the availability of multiple potentially applicable  
doctrinal sources renders pure Doctrinalism impossible. Unlike many of its 
caricatures, true Legal Realism does not challenge the perceived stability of 
the doctrine or its categories at a given time and place. This stability, which 
rests on the convergence of lawyers’ background understandings at a given 
time and place, is valuable for realists; it is crucial for complying with the 
rule of law by providing effective guidance to its addressees and constraining 
officials’ ability to exercise unconstrained power.  
This is why Realists find the law’s use of categories, concepts, and rules 
not only unavoidable but also desirable, and, thus, why they reject nominalism. 
For Realists, doctrine is and should be part of the law. But because doctrine 
qua doctrine is indeterminate, Legal Realists insist that some legal actors—
notably, legislators and appellate court judges—should occasionally use social 
developments and new cases as triggers for rethinking the doctrine’s 
conventional understanding. That is, they should be used as opportunities 
to revisit a doctrine’s normative viability and reexamine its categories’ 
adequacy. This task of critical reflection is even more important for legal 
scholarship, a point I will address briefly in my concluding remarks. 
Given this understanding of the law, it should not be surprising that 
Realists are not puzzled by the continued significance of doctrinal categories 
in legal discourse. Legal Realism definitively rejects the orthodox idea that 
doctrinal categories refine some eternal descriptive truths that transcend 
context and that doctrinal taxonomy aspires to produce a map of mutually 
 
4 I developed this understanding in a recent book, on which this Article draws. See HANOCH 
DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW 
THEORY (2013).  
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exclusive categories. Rather, Realists insist that the main roles of doctrinal 
categories are to consolidate people’s expectations and to express law’s ideals 
with respect to distinct types of human interaction. Therefore, Realists 
reconstruct doctrinal taxonomy so as to incorporate their insights on the 
inherent dynamism of law and the important function of contextual normative 
analysis in the evolution of doctrinal categories. Recasting doctrinal catego-
rization in these terms recognizes the dynamic dimension of the taxonomic 
enterprise. It also implies that doctrinal taxonomy should be sensitive to context 
and emphasizes the importance of relatively narrow doctrinal categories. 
Finally, a realist doctrinal taxonomy recognizes and accommodates substantial, 
although never overwhelming, overlaps among the various categories. 
I. THE REALIST CONCEPTION OF LAW  
The starting point of the realist account of law is its critique of a purely 
doctrinalist understanding of law. Law, in the doctrinal understanding, is 
perceived as a comprehensive and rigorously structured science, which can 
generate determinate and internally valid right answers; it need not resort 
to any social goals or human values and is thus strictly independent of the 
social sciences and the humanities.5 But equating law with doctrine is 
wrong, Realists argue, because the doctrine qua doctrine is radically inde-
terminate. Admittedly, as H.L.A. Hart claimed, the indeterminacy of 
discrete doctrinal sources is limited: the gap between language and reality 
does not mean that there are no easy cases for the application of a given 
legal rule.6 Realism views legal doctrine as hopelessly indeterminate, 
although not because of the indeterminacy of discrete doctrinal sources. 
Rather, the indeterminacy of legal doctrine derives primarily from the 
multiplicity of doctrinal materials potentially applicable at each juncture in 
any given case.7 Since legal norms are “in the habit of hunting in  
 
5 See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9, 198-99 (1992) (describing the goal of doctrinalism to be 
creating doctrine that could “render one right answer to any legal question”); Paul D. Carrington, 
Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691, 707-08 (1995) (discussing the notion of law as 
“apolitical, value-free, [and] technocratic”). 
6 See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123, 141-42, 144 (1961) (acknowledging that 
the generality of rules may lead to uncertainty in determining whether such rules apply in 
particular circumstances). 
7 See FELIX S. COHEN, The Problems of Functional Jurisprudence, in THE LEGAL  
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN 77, 83 (Lucy Kramer Cohen ed., 1960) 
(“Legal principles have a habit of running in pairs, a plaintiff principle and a defendant principle.” 
(citation omitted)); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Some Realism about Realism (“[T]he available authoritative 
premises . . . are at least two, and [] the two are mutually contradictory as applied to the case in 
hand.”), in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 42, 58 (1962); see also Andrew 
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pairs”8—because legal doctrine always offers at least “two buttons” between 
which a choice must be made—none of the doctrine’s answers to problems is 
preordained or inevitable.9  
Thus, Karl Llewellyn claims that legal doctrines are patchworks of  
contradictory premises covered by “ill-disguised inconsistency,” because, in 
all of them, “a variety of strands, only partly consistent with one another, 
exist side by side.”10 Any given legal doctrine—including the one guiding 
the lawyers’ interpretative activity (the canons of interpretation)11—suggests 
“at least two opposite tendencies” at every point.12 For (almost) every case 
there are opposite doctrinal sources that need to be accommodated: a rule 
and a frequently vague exception, or a seemingly precise rule and a vague 
standard that is also potentially applicable (such as “good faith” or “reasona-
bleness”). The availability of multiple doctrinal sources on any given legal 
question, all of which can be either contracted or expanded, results in 
profound and irreducible doctrinal indeterminacy.13 Similarly, the idea of 
inevitable answers to legal questions is also untenable, because the elabora-
tion of any legal concept can choose from a broad menu of possible  
alternatives.14 The multitude of contemporary understandings regarding any 
 
Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 208 (1986) 
(“[T]here was always a cluster of rules relevant to the decision in any litigated case.”). To clarify, 
Realists do not deny that legal doctrine in itself rules out most options. They merely insist that 
there are always more than one option that can doctrinally apply. 
8 Walter Wheeler Cook, The Paradoxes of Legal Science, 38 YALE L.J. 405, 406 (1929) (book 
review). 
9 See FRED RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU, LAWYERS! 154 (1940) (“The Law is not by several 
long shots the certain and exact science as which it masquerades.”); see also JEROME FRANK, LAW 
AND THE MODERN MIND 138 (1935) (arguing that at least some judicial discretion is unavoidable); 
LLEWELLYN, Some Realism about Realism, supra note 7, at 70 (arguing for the existence of at least 
some uncertainties in the law); John Dewey, Logical Method and Law (discussing the problems of 
uncertainty of outcomes and legal doctrine), in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 185, 192 (William W. 
Fisher III et al. eds., 1993). 
10 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 45 (Paul Gewirtz ed.,  
Michael Alsandi trans., 1989) (1933); see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 15-22 (1983) (describing legal doctrines as involving conflicts and 
countervailing considerations). 
11 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (detailing various 
canons of statutory construction which contradict one another). 
12 LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 51. 
13 See id. (arguing that there are at least two opposite methods of handling precedent in any 
given case). 
14 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809, 820-21, 827-29 (1935) (criticizing attempts of conceptual essentialism); see also  
HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 202 (“General propositions could not decide concrete cases because . . . 
there were multiple inferences to be made and thus multiple conclusions to be drawn.”). 
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given legal concept (such as property or contract), both within and outside 
any given jurisdiction, as well as the wealth of additional alternatives that 
legal history offers, defies the doctrinalist quest to find a single answer for 
any given legal issue.15 
The realist claim about an inevitable gap between doctrinal materials 
and judicial outcomes evokes two major concerns. First, what can explain 
past judicial behavior and predict its future course? Second, and more 
significantly, how can law constrain judgments made by unelected judges? 
How, in other words, can the distinction between law and politics be 
maintained despite the collapse of law’s autonomy in its doctrinalist rendi-
tion? The legitimacy prong of the realist challenge is particularly formidable 
because, as Legal Realists show, it is bolstered by the insidious tendency of 
legal Doctrinalism to obscure contestable value judgments made by judges 
(or other legal actors) and to entrench lawyers’ claim to an impenetrable 
professionalism, improperly shielded from critique by nonlawyers.16 
Legal Realists answer this challenge by advancing the view that law is a 
going institution (or set of institutions) distinguished by the difficult 
accommodation of the three constitutive yet irresolvable tensions  
mentioned above—the tensions between power and reason, science and 
craft, and tradition and progress.17  
 
15 See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION 221-24 (2004) 
(discussing the difficulties of using the concept of property to determine whether an unjust 
enrichment has occurred); HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS pt. one 
(2011) (rejecting the misleading dominant binarism in which property is either one monistic form, 
structured around Blackstone’s (in)famous formula of sole and despotic dominion, or a formless 
bundle of rights, and conceptualizing property as an umbrella for a set of institutions bearing a 
mutual family resemblance). 
16 Fred Rodell lamented along these lines lawyers’ success in making themselves “masters of 
their fellow men.” Lawyers, he argued, capture excessive social power by preventing any “brand 
competition or product competition.” They are able to gain this unjustified privileged position by 
creating and preserving (at times self-deceptively) a distinct language with a scientific appearance: 
the discourse of legal formalism. Rodell vividly presented this language as “a maze of confusing 
gestures and formalities,” a hodgepodge of “long words and sonorous phrases” with “ambiguous or 
empty meanings” frequently “contradictory of each other.” He further explained that lawyers are 
able to conceal the “emptiness” of doctrinal reasoning by their “sober pretense” that the doctrinal 
language—which is for nonlawyers “a foreign tongue”—“is, in the main, an exact science.” Legal 
Formalism is thus responsible for the unjustified privileged status of lawyers. RODELL, supra note 
9, at 8, 10, 105, 107, 125, 127; see also RONEN SHAMIR, MANAGING LEGAL UNCERTAINTY: ELITE 
LAWYERS IN THE NEW DEAL 166 (1995) (critiquing the idea of legal autonomy); Pierre Bourdieu, 
The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 819-21, 841-43 
(1987) (detailing the use of legal rhetoric and form to restrict access). 
17 Descendants of Legal Realism often focus on one aspect of the law (such as science or power) 
that enhances our understanding of law’s characteristics but ignores the central insight of Legal 
Realism: that law can properly be understood only if we appreciate its most distinctive feature, the 
uneasy but inevitable accommodation of the three constitutive tensions. 
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*      *      * 
 
The realist conception of law finds room for both power and reason,  
although it recognizes the difficulties of their coexistence. The Realists’ 
preoccupation with coercion is justified because, unlike other judgments, 
those prescribed by law’s carriers can recruit the state’s monopoly of power 
to back up their enforcement as well as institutional and discursive means 
that tend to downplay some dimensions of law’s power. These built-in 
features of law—notably the institutional division of labor between  
“interpretation specialists” and the actual executors of their judgments, 
together with our tendency to “thingify” legal constructs and accord them 
an aura of correctness and acceptability—render the danger of obscuring 
law’s coerciveness particularly troubling.18 They justify the Realists’ wariness 
of the trap created by the romanticization of law. 
But Realists reject as equally reductive the mirror image of law, which 
portrays it as sheer power, interest, or politics.19 They insist that law is also 
a forum of reason, and that reason imposes real—albeit elusive—constraints 
on the choices of legal decisionmakers, and thus on the subsequent imple-
mentation of state power.20 Law is never only about interest or power 
politics; it is also an exercise in reason-giving.21 Furthermore, because so 
much is at stake when reasoning about law, legal reasoning becomes particu-
larly urgent and rich, attentive, careful, and serious.22 Law’s coercive power 
 
18 See OLIVER W. HOLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law (criticizing formalism because 
pretending to find determinate doctrinal answers to legal questions prevents an open inquiry of 
the normative desirability of alternative judicial decisions), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 210, 
230, 232, 238-39 (1920); Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, supra note 14, 
at 811-12, 820-21, 827-29 (arguing that because lawyers tend to treat legal concepts as a  
non-modifiable part of our natural or ethical environment, they are “apt to forget the social forces 
which mold the law and the social ideals by which the law is to be judged”); Dewey, supra note 9, 
at 191, 193 (criticizing syllogistic reasoning which gives “an illusion of certitude” and unduly 
privileges the status quo). See generally ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word (discussing the way 
law’s division of institutional labor obscures the deep connection between violence and the law), in 
NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 203 (Martha Minow 
et al. eds., 1993). 
19 See K.N. Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic 
Method, 49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1362-63 (1940) (discussing the process of normative generalization, 
which often frames issues or arguments in diametrically opposing terms). 
20 See id. at 1364-65 (explaining that the normative power of legal authorities depends on its 
“effective expression of the recognized going order of the [e]ntirety”). 
21 See id. at 1364-65, 1367-68 (explaining the importance of regularity in addition to authority). 
22 See id. at 1370 (discussing the requirement that legal analysis include “certain minimum 
matters of substance” to be accepted (emphasis omitted)). 
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can only be justified if it is properly grounded in human values.23 Realists 
are thus impatient with attempts to equate normative reasoning with 
parochial interests or arbitrary power.24 They also find such exercises 
morally irresponsible because they undermine both the possibility of 
criticizing state power and the option of marshaling the law for morally 
required social change.25 
Yet, Realists are also wary of the idea that reason can displace interest, or 
that judges can set aside all influences except for the better argument. 
Because reasoning about law is reasoning about power and interest, the 
reasons given by law’s carriers should always be treated with suspicion. This 
caution explains Realists’ endorsement of value pluralism, as well as their 
understanding of law’s quest for justification as a perennial process that 
constantly invites criticism of law’s means, ends, and other (particularly 
distributive) consequences.26 
Legal Realists do not pretend they have solved the mystery of reason or 
demonstrated how reason can survive in law’s coercive environment. 
Nevertheless, their recognition that coerciveness and reason are doomed to 
coexist in any credible account of the law is significant. Making this tension 
an inherent characteristic of law requires rejecting reductionist theories 
employing an overly romantic or too cynical conception of law. This  
approach also forces us to be aware of the complex interaction between 
reason and power. It thereby seeks to accentuate the distinct responsibility 
incumbent on the reasoning of and about power, minimizing the corrupting 
potential of the self-interested pursuit of power, and the perpetuation of 
what could result as merely group preferences and interests.  
 
 
23 See id. at 1371 (“[N]othing is True Law which is not Just . . . .” ). 
24 See id. at 1381-83 (discussing the importance of the power to persuade). 
25 See id. at 1387 (discussing the legal system as a forum of societal change); see also Thomas 
W. Bechtler, American Legal Realism Revaluated (describing the law as a “means to ends”), in LAW 
IN SOCIAL CONTEXT: LIBER AMICORUM HONOURING PROFESSOR LON L. FULLER 3, 20-21 
(Thomas W. Bechtler ed., 1977); Harry W. Jones, Law and Morality in the Perspective of Legal 
Realism, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 809 (1961) (“In realist perspective, choice, decision, and 
responsibility for decision are central elements for a philosophy of law.”); Hessel E. Yntema, The 
Rational Basis of Legal Science, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 955 (1931) (“It is the faith of empirical legal 
science that ideals of justice not related to human needs are not true ideals . . . .”). 
26 See HOLMES, The Path of the Law (insisting that “[n]o concrete proposition is self-evident, 
no matter how ready we may be to accept it . . . .”), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, supra note 18, 
at 167, 181; LLEWELLYN, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law (explaining the role of 
common law as constantly reexamining its precedents to reach the good), in JURISPRUDENCE: 
REALISM IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 167, 211-12; Hessel E. Yntema, 
Jurisprudence on Parade, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1154, 1169 (1941) (discussing justice as a theory focused 
on “the search for better law”). 
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*      *      * 
 
I turn now to the type of reasons that Realists invite into legal discourse, 
introducing law’s second constitutive tension. Realists argue that the 
forward-looking aspect of legal reasoning relies on both science and craft. 
They recognize the profound differences between lawyers as social engi-
neers who dispassionately combine empirical knowledge with normative 
insights, on the one hand, and lawyers as practical reasoners who employ 
contextual judgment as part of a process of dialogic adjudication, on the 
other. They nonetheless insist on preserving the difficulty of accommodating 
science and craft as yet another tension constitutive of law. 
Realists emphasize the importance of empirical inquiries, such as  
investigating the hidden regularities of legal doctrine in order to restore 
law’s predictability or studying the practical consequences of law in order to 
better guide its evolution and protect its legitimacy.27 But the prototypical 
Realists presented in this Article reject any pretense that knowledge of 
these important social facts can be a substitute for political morality. They 
realize that value judgments are indispensable not only when evaluating 
empirical research, but also when simply choosing the facts to be investigated. 
Moreover, they are always careful not to accept existing normative  
preferences uncritically. Legal Realists insist that neither science nor ethics 
that ignores scientific data offers a valid test of law’s merits. Legal analysis 
needs both empirical data and normative judgments.28  
Because law affects people’s lives dramatically, social facts and human 
values must always inform the law’s evolution, but the realist conception of 
law also highlights that legal reasoning is a distinct mode of argumentation 
and analysis, different from other forms of practical reasoning. Hence, 
Realists pay attention to the distinctive institutional characteristics of law 
and study their potential virtues while remaining aware of their possible 
abuses. The procedural characteristics of the adversary process, as well as 
 
27 See generally, e.g., JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL 
SOCIAL SCIENCE chs. 2 & 4 (1995) (exploring efforts made by American legal scholars to bring 
empirical science into the study and teaching of law); Joseph W. Bingham, What is the Law?, 11 
MICH. L. REV. 1, 18 n.17 (1912) (arguing that past cases are used as “experimental guides to 
prognostications of future decisions”).  
28 See COHEN, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (arguing that even “[l]egal 
description is blind without the guiding light of a theory of values”), in THE LEGAL  
CONSCIENCE: SELECTED PAPERS OF FELIX S. COHEN, supra note 7, at 33, 76; Felix S. Cohen, 
Modern Ethics and the Law, 4 BROOK. L. REV. 33, 45 (1934) (“[T]he problems of the law 
have .  .  .  an aspect of value, which involves a moral judgment imposed upon the social facts.”); 
William Twining, The Idea of Juristic Method: A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 119, 
151-53 (1993) (discussing Karl Llewellyn’s skepticism about the project of pure empiricism). 
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the professional norms that bind judicial opinions—notably, the  
requirement of a universalizable justification—provide a unique social 
setting for adjudication. These characteristics establish the accountability of 
law’s carriers to law’s subjects and encourage judges to develop what Felix 
Cohen terms “a many-perspectived view of the world,” or a “synoptic vision” 
that “can relieve us of the endless anarchy of one-eyed vision.”29  
Moreover, because the judicial drama is always situated in a specific  
human context, lawyers have constant and unmediated access to human 
situations and actual problems of contemporary life. This contextual feature 
of legal judgments facilitates lawyers’ unique ability to capture the subtleties 
of various types of cases and to adjust the legal treatment of them to the 
distinct characteristics of each case.30  
 
*      *      * 
 
The extended realist treatment of science and craft derives from the 
conviction that law is profoundly dynamic, which leads to the third consti-
tutive tension identified. Law’s inherent dynamism implies that the legal 
positivist attempt to understand law by sheer reference to verifiable facts—
such as the authoritative commands of a political superior or the rules 
identified by a rule of recognition31—is hopeless. Under the realist conception, 
law is “a going institution” or, in John Dewey’s words, “a social process, not 
something that can be said to be done or happen at a certain date.”32 As an 
evolving institution, law is designed to be an “endless process of testing and 
 
29 Felix S. Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 242 (1950).  
30 See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 73-74 (1928) (celebrating 
the common law’s use of narrow categories, which help to produce “the discrimination necessary 
for intimacy of treatment,” hold lawyers close to “the actual transactions before them,” and 
therefore encourage them to shape law “close and contemporary” to the human problems that 
those lawyers deal with); see also, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453, 457 (1930) (arguing that wholesale legal categories are “too big to 
handle” since they encompass “too many heterogeneous items,” and recommending “[t]he making 
of smaller categories—which may either be sub-groupings inside the received categories, or may 
cut across them”). 
31 See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 14 (David Campbell 
& Philip Thomas ed., 1998) (1832) (discussing concepts of command, duty, and sanction); HART, 
supra note 6, at 107 (describing the rule of recognition); see also JOSEPH RAZ, Legal Positivism and 
the Sources of Law (explaining the “social thesis”), in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW 
AND MORALITY 37, 41-45 (1979). 
32 John Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN 
AMERICAN SCHOLARS 73, 77 (1941). 
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retesting.”33 Thus understood, law is a human laboratory constantly  
seeking improvement.34  
However, this quest for “justice and adjustment” in the legal discourse is 
constrained by legal tradition. The law’s past serves as the starting point for 
contemporary analysis because it is an anchor of intelligibility and predicta-
bility. Legal Realists begin with the existing doctrinal landscape because it 
may (and often does) incorporate valuable—although implicit and  
sometimes imperfectly executed—normative choices. In other words, 
because existing doctrine ideally combines both scientific and normative 
insights within a framework of legal professionalism premised on institu-
tional constraints and practical wisdom, it deserves respect.  
Although Legal Realists do not always defer to every existing rule, they 
do obey Llewellyn’s “Law of Fitness and Flavor,” whereby each outcome and 
rule “fit[s] with the feel” of the legal doctrine as a whole, and “go[es] with 
the grain rather than across or against it.”35 Realists celebrate common law’s 
“Grand Style,” described by Llewellyn as “a functioning harmonization of 
vision with tradition, of continuity with growth, of machinery with purpose, 
of measure with need,” mediating between “the seeming commands of the 
authorities and the felt demands of justice.”36 
II. THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE AND THE RULE OF LAW 
Where, if at all, does doctrine fit into this scheme? The realist critique of 
Doctrinalism is too often misinterpreted to imply that judges exercise 
unfettered discretion to reach results based on their personal predilections, 
which they then rationalize with an appropriate doctrinal basis.37 Brian 
 
33 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 179 (1921). 
34 See Dewey, My Philosophy of Law, supra note 32, at 77 (proposing the standard for evaluating 
law as being a function of what goes on socially); see also Karl N. Llewellyn, My Philosophy of Law, 
in MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CREDOS OF SIXTEEN AMERICAN SCHOLARS, supra note 32, at 
183, 183-84 (describing the law as a “going institution”). 
35 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 191, 222 (1960). 
36 Id. at 37-38; see also LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 
77 (claiming that tradition-determined lawyers can solve new cases in ways “much in harmony 
with those of other lawyers,” as they are all trained to bring the solution to new cases into 
harmony with “the essence and spirit of existing law”); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, Some Realism About 
Realism, supra note 7, at 357, 361-62 (discussing the common law as providing limitations on 
deviations from existing rules); Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem 
of Juristic Method, supra note 19, at 1385 (arguing that law is typified by a persistent and “strongly 
present [ ] urge” to “make good”). 
37 See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 268 (1997) (“[I]t is . . . quite misleading to think of Realism as committed to the claim 
that judges exercise ‘unfettered’ discretion or that they make choices based on ‘personal’ values 
and tastes.”). 
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Leiter describes this view as the “Frankification” of Legal Realism and 
correctly charges its subscribers with the fallacy of viewing Jerome Frank—
an extreme proponent of the so-called “Idiosyncrasy Wing” of Legal  
Realism—as Realism’s typical representative.38 But, as Leiter notes, Frank is 
a minority voice.39  
Indeed, mainstream Legal Realists reject Frank’s subjectivism.40 Thus, 
Cohen maintains that because law is a social institution, legal results are 
“[l]arge-scale social facts” that “cannot be explained in terms of the atomic 
idiosyncrasies and personal prejudices of individuals.”41 According to 
Cohen, the “‘hunch’ theory of law” magnifies “the personal and accidental 
factors in judicial behavior” and ignores the “predictable uniformity in the 
behavior of courts.”42 Cohen further claims that “[l]aw is not a mass of 
unrelated decisions nor a product of judicial bellyaches. Judges are human, 
but they are a peculiar breed of humans, selected to a type and held to 
service under a potent system of governmental controls.”43 Genuinely 
peculiar decisions are therefore bound to erode and be washed away, 
forgotten in a system that regularly and consistently provides appeals, 
rehearings, impeachments, and legislation.44 While Legal Realists do not 
deny that the personalities of individual judges may affect outcomes in 
particular cases,45 most believe that “[t]he eccentricities of judges balance 
 
38 See id. at 269, 279, 283 (defining the “Idiosyncrasy Wing” as the claim “that judges make [] 
choice[s] in light of personal or idiosyncratic tastes and values”). But see Michael Ansaldi, The 
German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 705, 775-77 (1992) (criticizing the “very different images” 
presented by Jerome Frank and Karl Llewellyn and reconciling their views on jurisprudence). 
39 Leiter, supra note 37, at 269, 283-84.  
40 Frank himself never renounced his irrationalist view, encapsulated in the reference to “the 
judicial hunch.” He merely believed that this hunch could become more benevolent. See ROBERT 
JEROME GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER: JEROME FRANK’S IMPACT ON 
AMERICAN LAW 49-50 (1985) (espousing the theory that judges work back from conclusions to 
principles to preserve the myth that law is a consistent body of principles); Bruce A. Ackerman, 
Jerome Frank’s Law and the Modern Mind, 103 DAEDALUS 119, 122 (1974) (book review) (describing 
Frank’s claim that lawyers undertake “an elaborate course of rationalization to transform the law 
into a father-substitute which could give a clear and authoritative answer to all the problems of 
social existence”). 
41 Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, supra note 29, at 250. 
42 Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, supra note 14, at 843. 
43 Id. 
44 See id. (“The decision that is ‘peculiar’ suffers erosion—unless it represents the first salient 
manifestation of a new social force, in which case it soon ceases to be peculiar.”). 
45 For a poignant example—an exception that proves the rule—see Republic of Bolivia v. Philip 
Morris, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009-10 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (using colorful language, such as “the Court 
seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live Bolivian . . . even on the Discovery 
Channel,” and “[t]hough only here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered 
by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for dispensing justice with unparal-
leled fairness and alacrity, apparently in common discussion even on the mountain peaks of 
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one another,”46 and that most legal decisions follow essentially predictable 
patterns.47 
None of this undermines the realist claim that a gap will necessarily  
exist between doctrinal rules and judicial outcomes. Law cannot be fully 
understood as a set of concepts and rules, able to transcend the legal 
tradition in which it is situated and independent of any extradoctrinal 
understandings of the legal community.48 Mainstream Legal Realism 
neither maintains that the gap between doctrine and law is filled with 
subjectivity nor denies the existence of legal reality. Instead, it aligns itself 
with Benjamin Cardozo’s critique of “the jurists who seem to hold that in 
reality there is no law except the decisions of the courts.”49 Cardozo argues 
that this position is fallacious because it denies the “present” of law: “Law 
never is, but is always about to be. It is realized only when embodied in a 
judgment, and in being realized, expires.”50 This denial of an existing legal 
reality is rejected because our daily experience disproves it; “[l]aw and 
obedience to law are facts confirmed every day to us all in our experience of 
life. If the result of a definition is to make them seem to be illusions, so 
much the worse for the definition.”51  
 
*      *      * 
 
Unlike their image in some caricatures of Legal Realism, Realists do not 
challenge the felt predictability of the doctrine at a given time and place. 
While persuasively insisting that legal doctrine qua doctrine cannot  
constrain decisionmakers, they recognize that the convergence of lawyers’ 
 
Bolivia!” in a decision on a motion to transfer venue, adding that given that “the judge of this 
Court simply loves cigars, the Plaintiff can be expected to suffer neither harm nor prejudice by a 
transfer to Washington, D.C.”). 
46 CARDOZO, supra note 33, at 177; see also ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 457-58 (1998) (de-
scribing Cardozo’s belief that most neorealists do not believe in pure “ad hoc judicial subjectivism”). 
47 See Leiter, supra note 37, at 283-84 (generalizing the works of Llewellyn, Moore, Oliphant, 
Cohen, and Radin as falling into the sociological wing of Realism); Llewellyn, My Philosophy of 
Law, supra note 32, at 196-97 (describing how legal results evolve and eventually form patterns, 
allowing citizens to understand and respect the rule of law). 
48 Cf. BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 181-82 (1993) (arguing that 
results are not necessarily “required” by the wording of a rule, because such an interpretative 
method may lead to absurd results or the wording may be ambiguous). 
49 CARDOZO, supra note 33, at 124. 
50 Id. at 126. 
51 Id. at 127; see also RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO:  
PERSONAL VALUES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 162-63 (1997) (explaining that Cordozo’s 
agreement in Realism was its loosening of the rigidity to precedent and its recognition that 
principles needed to be adjusted to fit the “social consciousness”).  
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background understandings at a given time and place generates a significant 
measure of stability.52 It is this stability, I argue, that explains “the ubiquitous 
practice . . . of accusing judges who have reached disagreeable results in 
appellate cases of having made technical legal errors or ‘mistakes’ rather 
than of having the wrong substantive views.”53 
Realists, for example, have demonstrated that the various methods of 
distinguishing between ratio decidendi (holding) and obiter dictum (dicta) 
allow significant leeway.54 Yet they do not deny that the practice of precedent 
is robust enough so that different lawyers tend to employ similar techniques 
for the ratio decidendi–obiter dictum distinction.55 Similarly, the realist 
claim about the indeterminacy of canons of interpretation is not threatened 
by the fact that the practice of law provides insiders with determinate 
answers to doctrinal interpretive quandaries.56 Instead, refining these 
sources of predictability vindicates the realist claim that the real work of 
determining the content of the legal doctrine is accomplished through these 
 
52 See LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES: MORALITY, RULES, 
AND THE DILEMMAS OF LAW 32-34 (2001) (examining the “inevitable gap” that exists between 
rules and background morality and admonishing those contemporary jurisprudential schools of 
thought that attempt to reconcile them). 
53 Frederick Schauer, Legal Realism Untamed, 91 TEX. L. REV. 749, 762 (2013). 
54 As Llewellyn explains, in distinguishing between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum, judges 
can rely either on the rule stated by the previous court or on the legally relevant facts (or on both). 
Furthermore, even if we focus on only one method, significant indeterminacy still remains. Thus, 
respecting stated reasons or articulated rules, Llewellyn refers to the difficulty of accumulative or 
alternative reasons that generates “an intermediate type of authority”: in such “multi-point 
decision[s],” each leg “is much more subject to challenge than it would be if the decision stood on 
it alone.” KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW 
AND LAW SCHOOL 44 (1930). Furthermore, even with regard to each reason given by the court 
for its decision, some ambiguity remains. First, judges tend to repeat their reasons and the rules 
they state, but “the repetition seldom is exact.” Id. at 45. Second, opinions are always read 
contextually, that is “with primary reference to the particular dispute,” which requires a difficult 
distinction between some arguments or illustrations that must be confined to the case at hand and 
others that enjoy a much more general applicability. Id. at 39. Similar indeterminacy faces the 
method of figuring out the holding of a case by focusing on the facts of the actual dispute before 
the court. Obviously, not each and every fact stated by the court is legally significant: some are 
discarded “as of no interest whatsoever . . . others as dramatic but as legal nothings.” Id. at 46. 
Moreover, the relevant facts are not treated as such, but are rather classified in categories that are 
deemed significant. But neither the selection of the pertinent facts nor their classification into 
categories is a self-evident or logically necessary undertaking. In all these ways, judges have 
significant discretion as to the question of how wide, or how narrow, the ratio decidendi of the 
case should be, that is, what should its scope be vis-à-vis other rules. See generally LLEWELLYN, THE 
CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 77-91. 
55 See Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431, 433-34 (1989) 
(analyzing the various ways of distinguishing between the categories of holding and dictum). 
56 But see Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling Canons,” One to 
Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919, 920 (2005–2006) (arguing that Llewellyn’s tenets are 
“devastatingly inconsistent”).  
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background understandings rather than the doctrine itself.57 It also shows 
that Legal Realism does not threaten the rule of law, but rather merely 
insists that law’s stability and predictability do not inhere in doctrine but in 
the broader social practice of law.58  
Legal Realism shifts the focus from black letter law to the prevalent  
understandings of the legal community regarding the doctrine—the implicit 
sense of obviousness insiders share as per “on-the-wall” interpretations of 
the doctrine,59 which is an important feature of the legal craft. The realist 
claim of radical doctrinal indeterminacy implies a wide breadth of potential 
judicial choice, but does not mean that judges use, should use, or should 
even consider using this menu of options in every case. To the contrary, 
case-by-case adjudication inhibits law’s ability to provide effective guidance, 
thereby infringing on people’s ability to form reasonable expectations and 
plan for the future.60  
Such ad hocism also implies that adjudicators face no restricting frame-
work of public norms, thereby paving the way for judges’ “preferences, their 
own ideology, or their own individual sense of right and wrong” to determine 
the outcomes of cases.61 Therefore, Legal Realists who, as noted, are aware 
 
57 See Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Constructed Constraint and the Constitutional Text, 64 
DUKE L.J. 1213, 1216-17, (2015) (describing how the perceived clarity of the constitutional text is 
partially constructed by various extratextual methods—the purpose of constitutional provisions, 
structural inferences, understandings of the national ethos, consequentialist considerations, 
customary practices, and precedent—that are commonly presented as relevant only after a text is 
determined to be vague or ambiguous).  
58 See Frederick Schauer, Editor’s Introduction (explaining why Llewellyn’s theory of rules 
does not undermine law’s predictability and stability), to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY 
OF RULES 1, 5, 7-8, 18, 20-24 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011); see also Margaret Jane Radin, 
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 803 (1989) (“[W]e [should not] hastily conclude 
that because there is no such thing as traditional formal realizability, everything is indeterminate 
or up for grabs.”). 
59 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 711-25 (2005) (arguing that “what is a good or bad legal argument about the 
Constitution, what is a plausible legal claim, and what is ‘off-the-wall’ change over time in 
response to changing social, political, and historical conditions”); see also P. S. Atiyah, Common 
Law and Statute Law, 48 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5 (1985) (discussing how statutes are often passed in 
response to changes in the common law, which in itself contributes to further changes in common 
law); Gerald J. Postema, Law’s System: The Necessity of System in Common Law, 2014 N.Z. L. REV. 
69, 80 (arguing that the introduction of new legal material should be viewed as a “disturbance of 
the equilibrium state of a dynamic system,” rather than merely “adding an item to a list, or a stone 
to a pile”). 
60 See JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and its Virtue (describing the “evils of uncertainty” and 
arguing that law should be relatively stable), in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY, supra note 31, at 210, 213, 220, 222 (1979). 
61 Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008); see also Martin 
Krygier, Four Puzzles about the Rule of Law: Why, What, Where? And Who Cares? (“[P]erhaps the 
most basic and elemental consequence of arbitrary threats to one’s liberty . . . [is] the potentially 
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of the fallibility of law bearers and are also committed to the use of law for 
the furtherance of human values distance themselves from the nominalist 
approach of open-ended discretionary decisionmaking. Legal Realism 
neither endorses nor implies the need to focus on the equities of the 
particular case or the particular parties, but sanctions the relative stability of 
the social practice of law. It does so by using the prevalent understandings 
of the legal community regarding doctrine, which serve as an invaluable 
means for respecting and furthering the two aspects of the rule of law: the 
requirement that law guide its subjects’ behavior, and the prescription that 
law not confer on officials the right to exercise  
unconstrained power.  
 
*      *      * 
 
This appreciation of law’s stability explains Llewellyn’s endorsement of 
the common law tradition. Although adjudication is necessarily creative, he 
claimed that cases are decided with “a desire to move in accordance with the 
material as well as within it . . . to reveal the latent rather than to impose 
new form, much less to obtrude an outside will.”62 The case law system 
imposes a “demand for moderate consistency, for reasonable regularity, for 
on-going conscientious effort at integration.”63 Legal Realists begin with the 
existing doctrinal landscape that often reflects valuable normative choices, 
even if implicit and sometimes imperfectly executed. Nonetheless, Legal 
Realists recognize that the existing doctrinal environment always leaves 
interpretive leeway.64  
They further insist that while law’s craft-based stability meets the rule of 
law concerns, law’s legitimacy cannot and should not rely solely on the legal 
craft. This is why Realists conceptualize law’s potential dynamism, as long 
as it is properly cautious and not too frequent, as the anchor of our perennial 
quest for “better and best law” and, therefore, our judges’ “duty to justice 
and adjustment,” thus implying an “on-going production and improvement 
 
devastating impositions of power unrestrained by the need to give consideration to anything but 
the will and whim of the power-holder.”), in GETTING TO THE RULE OF LAW 64, 79-80 (James 
E. Fleming ed., 2011). 
62 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 35, at 222. 
63 Id. at 223. 
64 See Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method, 
supra note 19, at 1385 (arguing that “in no skillfully built legal structure is the factor of movement  
[ ] and of need for movement . . . disregarded”). 
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of rules.”65 Whereas the daily life of the law relies on lawyers’ conventional 
understandings of the doctrine (and thus ensuring compliance with the rule 
of law), Realists underscore the contingency of these understandings and 
their potential transformation. Their conception of law invites challenges to 
the doctrine’s “on-the-wall” interpretations and thus forces law’s carriers to 
intermittently attempt to justify what they would otherwise tend to naturalize. 
As Llewellyn implies, adjudication typically manifests these developments 
piecemeal, without explicit recourse to nondoctrinal features of law, such as 
empirical facts and normative judgments that often, as Realists insist, rely 
on the insights of other disciplines. But although Realists—like many legal 
theorists—pay particular attention to adjudication, they opt for a “style of 
jurisprudence” that goes beyond adjudication to consider many other arenas 
“replete with lawmaking, law applying, law interpreting, and law developing 
functions.”66 Integrating power into their conception of law also pushes 
Realists to be wary of implying that the pace of legal change should always 
be restrained or that legal normativity is exhausted by the subset of moral 
principles embedded in past legal, political, and particularly adjudicative 
practices.67 Given that the sources of law’s stability cannot be enshrined in 
black-letter law, even adjudication need not necessarily be invariably  
dominated by doctrinalist discourse.68  
Thus, Roscoe Pound observed a fairly predictable pattern in the devel-
opment of legal discourse, which alternates between periods of fixity and 
periods of innovation and change. In former times, “[p]erfection of  
scientific system and exposition tends to cut off individual initiative . . . to 
stifle independent consideration of new problems and of new phases of old 
problems, and to impose the ideas of one generation upon another.”69 These 
are periods “in which science degenerates, in which system decays into 
technicality, [and] in which a scientific jurisprudence becomes a mechanical 
jurisprudence” so that “artificiality in law” is regarded as an end and law’s 
consequences and purposes are repressed.70 Then, at some point—which we 
 
65 LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS, supra note 35, at 36, 
38, 190. 
66 Roy Kreitner, Biographing Realist Jurisprudence, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 765, 780 (2010). 
67 Cf. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 26-27 (2011) 
(summarizing the scope of Dworkinian principles and their relation to the law). 
68 See, for example, Edward Rock’s account of the Delaware corporate  
adjudication demonstrates. Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Doctrine and the Legacy of American 
Legal Realism, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 2019 (2015). 
69 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 606 (1908). 
70 Id. at 607-08. 
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might (metaphorically) call a “paradigm shift”71—the discontent with the 
distance between doctrinal discourse (lawyers’ “normal science”) and law’s 
ends becomes sufficiently high so as to break the inertia of such mechanical 
jurisprudence and replace it with “a jurisprudence of ends.”72 And again, the 
sequence continues with its own structural circularity: when a jurisprudence 
of ends becomes mature and stable, it becomes canonized and locked in our 
conventional understandings of conceptions and rules, effectively becoming 
our new doctrine, and “the opportunity for constructive work is largely 
eliminated.”73 
III. DOCTRINAL CATEGORIES, REALISTICALLY RECONSTRUCTED  
The same a priori—but never unqualified, and at times even suspicious—
respect typical of the realist attitude towards the legal community’s dominant 
understandings of doctrine also characterizes the way Realists perceive 
doctrinal categories, again explaining both categories’ persistent significance 
in legal discourse and their amenability to change. Clarifying the role of 
doctrinal categories along these lines also sheds light on some of their 
typical features, thus refining the distinctive realist approach to legal 
categorization. 
Legal Realism acknowledges the truism that reasoning in general, and 
legal reasoning in particular, must rely on certain concepts and categories that 
necessarily involve some classificatory work, and requires some organization of 
the body of legal rules to make them accessible to legal actors.74 But Realists 
resist the traditional (i.e., doctrinalist) approach to categorization that views 
the taxonomic venture as distinct from law’s “organizational claims,”75 so 
that doctrinal rules merely describe the legal landscape. They reject, in 
other words, the traditional analogy of doctrinal classification to cartog-
 
71 My reference here to “paradigm shift” and later to “normal science” evokes, of course, Thomas 
Kuhn’s distinction in THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). 
72 Pound, supra note 69, at 611-12. 
73 Id. at 608. See generally EDWARD B. MCLEAN, LAW AND CIVILIZATION: THE LEGAL 
THOUGHT OF ROSCOE POUND ch. 2 (1992) (discussing Pound’s thoughts on legal history). 
74 See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661, 710 
(1989) (“[A]ttempting to proceed without paradigms represents a denial of that which cannot be 
denied.”); Emily Sherwin, Legal Taxonomy, 15 LEGAL THEORY 25, 40 (2009) (“A comprehensive 
classification of legal rules helps legal actors locate pertinent rules.”); Peter Jaffey, Classification and 
Unjust Enrichment, 67 MOD. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2004) (book review) (explaining that even when 
no applicable rule dictates an outcome in a particular case, judges often make decisions by 
analogizing the facts of a case to a similar doctrinal principle). 
75 See Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Seriously, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 241, 249-56 (2000)  
(arguing that understanding law’s “organizational claims,” which includes searching for “an 
intelligible order within them,” is essential).  
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raphy.76 Whereas cartography implies “a fixed and immutable topography 
‘out there,’ waiting to be accurately charted,” law can (and at times should) 
change, so that “no map is ever likely to be produced that can, at one and 
the same time, explain the past and act as a means for predicting the 
future.”77  
Thus, Llewellyn invites lawyers to rethink law’s received categories: 
while legal classification cannot be eliminated, “to classify is to disturb” and 
hence to “obscure some of the data under observation and give fictitious 
value to others.”78 For this reason, he adds that classifications “can be 
excused only insofar as [they are] necessary to the accomplish[ment] of a 
purpose,” and that because purposes may change, “the available traditional 
categories” should be periodically reexamined.79 Reexamining doctrinal 
categorization is also important because it may help expose, rethink, and 
hopefully remedy otherwise hidden and sometimes unjustified choices of 
inclusion and exclusion.80 A charitable reading of Cohen’s famous critique of 
the “thingification” of legal concepts warns, along these lines, against the 
insidious tendency of contingent doctrinal categories to be made permanent 
as if they somehow transcend human choice and preclude modification or 
replacement, if necessary.81  
Appreciating that our doctrinal categories do not merely frame our legal 
knowledge,82 but necessarily participate in our construction of it and thus in 
 
76 See, e.g., Peter Birks, Introduction (discussing proposals for law schools to abolish legal 
categories), in ENGLISH PRIVATE LAW xxxv, xxxv-vi (Peter Birks ed., 2000). 
77 Geoffrey Samuel, Can the Common Law be Mapped?, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 271, 290, 295 
(2005); see also STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND 
CONCEPTS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 226 (2003) (“Cartography assumes the 
comparative stability of the geographical features to be mapped, but law is constantly changing . . . .”); 
Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 HARV. L. REV. 933, 942-43 (1924) (discussing various 
theories of the purposes of classifications).  
78 Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, supra note 30, at 27. 
79 Id.  
80 See LLEWELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES, supra note 58, at 95 (describing how classifications 
“both shape and limit our rules”). 
81 See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, supra note 14, at 811-12, 
814-18, 820-21, 840 (criticizing the logic of various court opinions and principles that invoke 
“transcendental nonsense”). As the text implies, this reading does not dispute the importance of 
legal concepts in facilitating law’s systematicity, namely, in “keep[ing] track of the significance of 
legal changes in a complex patchwork of doctrine.” Jeremy Waldron, “Transcendental Nonsense” and 
System in the Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 52 (2000). 
82 Contra Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 W. AUSTL. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (1996) (discussing how one separation between law and equity emanates into the 
proposition that all rights are either legal or equitable). 
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the ongoing evolution of law83 is crucial to understanding the realist  
approach to legal categorization. The realist approach indeed begins, as 
Llewellyn prescribed, with the functions of doctrinal categories. In accordance 
with its insistence that law in both substance and form should serve life, 
Legal Realism appreciates the purposes served by doctrinal categories, 
which allow law to consolidate expectations and also express the normative 
ideals underlying its regulation of core types of human relationships. Each 
doctrinal category targets, in its own way and with respect to some intended 
realm of application, a set of human values that can be served by its consti-
tutive rules. It thus enables people to predict the consequences of future 
contingencies and plan and structure their lives accordingly, and it performs 
a significant cultural function by expressing law’s ideals for the pertinent 
type of human interaction.84  
Both roles—consolidating expectations and expressing law’s ideals—
imply that law can recognize a necessarily limited number of doctrinal 
categories and, more importantly, that they should be relatively stable. 
Neither function, however, implies stagnation. Indeed, the appeal of 
prevailing doctrinal categories is not necessarily the end of the legal analysis, 
because invoking them allows some modifications to their content and 
boundaries. Respecting the values served by the stability of our conventional 
legal categorization does imply that these moments of “jurisprudence of 
ends” should not be too frequent and that the potential detrimental implications 
of destabilizing such categorization should always be taken into account. But 
certain legal actors should, in these more reflective moments, follow Llewellyn’s 
injunction and refuse to accept the existing doctrinal categories as a given. 
They should take the values underlying these categories—and not only their 
conventional content—as intrinsic to their analysis, critically examining the 
continued validity and desirability of these values, their responsiveness to 
 
83 See Geoffrey Samuel, English Private Law: Old and New Thinking in the Taxonomy Debate, 
24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 335, 362 (2004) (“[S]chemes and paradigms are not ‘triggered’ by 
events but are imposed on them in order to elicit information.”); see also MARTHA MINOW, 
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 8 (1990) 
(positing that doctrinal categorization should be open-ended and determined through interaction 
rather than bounded); WADDAMS, supra note 77, at 2 (“A desire for precision and order naturally 
leads to a search for clear categories and good maps, but such a search, if pressed too far, may be 
self-defeating. . . .”); Feinman, supra note 74, at 663 (noting that a “classification problem” has 
unfolded along the tort–contract boundary); Pound, supra note 77, at 937-38 (demonstrating the 
inapplicability of biological classification to the practice of law); Samuel, supra note 77, at 286 
(“[J]udges do not construct factual statements to conform to some pre-existing map but use the 
‘map’—the structure—to help construct the factual situations themselves.”).  
84 See, e.g., DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 29-30  
(describing the importance of analyzing values to assess the desirability of doctrinal rules in 
property law). 
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the social context in which they are situated, and the effectiveness of the 
rules constituting the pertinent doctrinal category for promoting its contex-
tually examined normative goals.85 Here, we must rely on the vague notion 
of “promoting” to capture the complex ways in which law can facilitate 
human values. This normative analysis recommended by Legal Realism 
seeks to capture law’s material effect on people’s behavior, its expressive and 
constitutive impact, and the intricate interdependence of the two effects.86 
The realist approach to doctrinal categories is thus an exercise in legal 
optimism. At times, this approach helps to fill doctrinal gaps by prescribing 
new rules that bolster and vindicate these goals further. At other times, it 
points out “blemishes” in the existing categories, rules that undermine the 
most illuminating and defensible account of such a doctrinal category that 
should be reformed so that the law may live up to its own ideals.87 This 
reformist potential may yield different types of legal reforms. In some cases, 
the reform may be quite radical: the abolition of a category, an overall 
reconstruction of its content, or a significant change in the way it is subdivided. 
In others, more moderate options are in order, such as restating the doctrine 
pertaining to a given category in a way that brings its rules closer to its 
underlying values and, in the process, removing indefensible rules or adjusting 
the category to the various social contexts in which it may be situated.88  
 
*      *      * 
 
The constructive function and potential dynamism of the realist  
understanding of doctrinal categorization underlie two further characteris-
tics of the realist taxonomic blueprint, which are again antithetic to its 
doctrinalist counterpart. Doctrinalists regard categories as necessarily 
autonomous and mutually exclusive, so that “a classified answer to a ques-
tion must use categories which are perfectly distinct from one another.”89 
Because the project of legal categorization for them is analogous to the 
project of classifying natural features of our world, they see the idea of some 
 
85 Cf. Ernest J. Weinrib, The Juridical Classification of Obligations (recognizing that doctrinal 
rules may sometimes be modified, even though the author is not a Legal Realist), in THE 
CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS 37, 37-38, 55 (Peter Birks ed., 1997). 
86 See DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, ch. 6 (discussing the 
interdependence of property law’s incentives and its expressive effects). 
87 Cf. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 118-23 (describing a hypothetical situation in which a modi-
fication of doctrine is desirable). 
88 See DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 31 (noting that this 
approach to reformulating doctrinal categories follows the common law, which mediates between “the 
seeming commands of the authorities and the felt demands of justice” (citation omitted)).  
89 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1767, 1794 (2001). 
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overlaps between categories as misguided.90 For the doctrinalist, the test of 
success for a legal taxonomy is precisely its success in generating a scheme 
where different categories, governed by differing principles,91 “stand in 
splendid isolation from one another in legal discourse.”92 The ideal taxonomy 
is one that allows autonomy between categories and safeguards the bounda-
ries between distinct doctrinal fields.93  
By contrast, Realists are comfortable with some degree of overlap  
between categories. Realists are not alarmed or embarrassed by overlaps 
because they do not submit to the doctrinalist claim that overlaps are 
conceptually impossible. They highlight the confusion resulting from the 
assumption of this claim, namely that the endeavor of legal classifiers is 
exogenous to the object’s character. They insist that, once this presupposition 
is set aside, complete autonomy becomes a rather extreme condition and 
should not, in any event, be the test of taxonomical success.94  
 
90 See id. at 1781 (arguing that categories of classification are exclusive of one another).  
91 See Weinrib, supra note 85, at 39 (discussing the bases underlying legal classifications); cf. 
Steve Hedley, Unjust Enrichment: A Middle Course?, 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 181, 
194-95 (2002) (summarizing different theories underlying the idea of unjust enrichment); Peter 
Jaffey, Two Theories of Unjust Enrichment (arguing that restitution is not a coherent category 
because different unjust enrichment claims are premised upon two different theories), in 
UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT 139, 141 (Jason W. Neyers et al. eds., 2004). 
92 Bruce A. Ackerman, The Structure of Subchapter C: An Anthropological Comment, 87 YALE 
L.J. 436, 439 (1977). 
93 See generally Jacob Weinrib, What Can Kant Teach Us About Legal Classification, 23  
CANADIAN J.L. & JURIS. 203 (2010) (discussing fundamental questions that must be addressed by 
any doctrinal classification); see also Darryn Jensen, The Problem of Taxonomy in Private Law, 31 
MELB. U. L. REV. 516, 520 (2007) (“The precise bounds of the factual territory covered by a 
category will not be known in advance, but to acknowledge that is not to deny the existence of a 
category of cases which is susceptible to abstract definition.”).  
94 See WADDAMS, supra note 77, at 226-27 (arguing that divisions are not mutually exclusive); 
Ackerman, supra note 92, at 439 (positing that principles may be dominant, subordinate, or 
reciprocal to one another); Samuel, supra note 77, at 286 (discussing how statutory codes are not 
“closed systems”). A degree of overlap that destroys any possibility of sensibly producing 
normative, and thus doctrinal, recommendations about any given doctrinal category would indeed 
take the bite out of the taxonomical project. But the realist case for accommodating overlaps does 
not take this extreme position, and this chaotic predicament is definitively not the only alternative 
to strict doctrinal autonomy. Some overlaps between doctrinal categories need not destroy the 
common denominators—the similarities holding together the rules of any given category. Cf. Kit 
Barker, Understanding the Unjust Enrichment Principle in Private Law: A Study of the Concept and its 
Reasons, (stressing that an essentialist view of unjust enrichment cannot work because the category 
spans a diverse range of cases), in UNDERSTANDING UNJUST ENRICHMENT, supra note 91, at 81; 
Feinman, supra note 74, at 699-700 (discussing how, because of the overlap of elements, paradigms 
often have “fuzzy” boundaries). As long as these common denominators are broad enough to yield 
sufficiently robust normative (and thus doctrinal) recommendations, holding on to the doctrinal 
category is realistically justified. Cf. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An 
Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 225 (2010) (“The more that common and 
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Quite the contrary, Realists believe that in most cases some overlaps are 
perfectly acceptable, or even desirable. In justifying and framing principles 
for one area of the law, Bruce Ackerman explains, “lawyers often recognize 
that the principles governing [another area] are relevant to their problem.”95 
Therefore, it should not be surprising to identify some relationships of 
dependence between legal categories, either through the subordination of 
one to the other or through mutual reciprocity, so that “either may be 
invoked as a source of argument in a lawyer’s evaluation of the other.”96 This 
is a straightforward proposition for Realists, emanating from the mundane 
observation that life is messy and that different contexts, while distinct in 
some senses, often raise overlapping normative concerns.97 Reciprocity, 
rather than autonomy, seems to be the name of the taxonomic game.98 
The final distinguishing feature of the realist categorization program is 
its emphasis on relatively narrow categories.99 Realists need not and (as we 
will shortly see) do not dismiss the importance of broad categories, such as 
property. But although such wholesale categories may be helpful as catego-
ries of thinking, they are typically troublesome as categories for deciding, 
because their broad common denominator derives from the similarity of the 
questions they invoke. This is why Llewellyn finds such categories, which 
encompass too “many heterogeneous items,” “too big to handle,” and 
therefore recommends “[t]he making of smaller categories—which may 
either be sub-groupings inside the received categories, or may cut across 
them.”100 By employing such narrow categories, each covering only relatively 
few human situations, he explains, lawyers can develop the law while 
 
distinctive features predominate within the field, the more useful the field is likely to be as an 
analytical category.”). 
95 Ackerman, supra note 92, at 439. 
96 Id. 
97 Cf. Feinman, supra note 74, at 689-91 (explaining that contract and tort both embody similar, 
complex views of how social relations ought to be organized, and thus any classification scheme 
distinguishing in accordance with these is inherently flawed). 
98 See DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION, supra note 15, at 34 (describing 
overlaps between various areas of law); see also WADDAMS, supra note 77, at 1-2 (discussing the 
importance of recognizing overlap to understanding legal schemes). 
99 Contra Peter Birks, Definition and Division: A Mediation on Institutes 3.13 (describing core  
concepts supplied by the Institutes), in THE CLASSIFICATION OF OBLIGATIONS, supra note 85, at 1, 34-
35; Weinrib, supra note 85, at 40 (explaining ways in which distinctions among classifications can fail). 
100 Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, supra note 30, at 457; see also William 
W. Fisher III, The Development of American Legal Theory and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of 
Rights (commenting that it does not make sense to have a general rule governing all contracts 
because the circumstances surrounding different agreements vary dramatically), in A CULTURE OF 
RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, at 266, 
275 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991). 
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“test[ing] it against life-wisdom.”101 Again, the claim is not that “the equities 
or sense of the particular case or the particular parties” should be determi-
native; rather, it is that decisionmaking should benefit from “the sense and 
reason of some significantly seen type of life-situation.”102  
Our lives are divided into economically and socially differentiated— 
though certainly not completely separate and distinct—segments. Each 
“transaction of life” has some features of sufficient normative importance 
(meaning they gain significance from the perspective of some general 
principle or policy), which justify distinct legal treatment. If law is to serve 
life, as Realists insist it must, it should seek to tailor its categories narrowly 
and in accordance with these patterns of human conduct and interaction, so 
that it can eventually capture and respond to the characteristics of each type 
of case.103 This substantive reasoning also implies that such carefully 
tailored categories are likely to be more compatible with the guidance 
prescription of the rule of law than the broader categories often favored by 
doctrinalists. Because narrow categories can be more normatively coherent—
given that each one is more meaningfully informed by one animating 
principle (one value or one specific balance of values)—they can serve as 
guides for action better than the wholesale categories with much thinner 
common denominators to which they belong. 
IV. A CASE STUDY: ON PROPERTY AND PROPERTY INSTITUTIONS  
This short Article cannot provide a comprehensive realist categorization 
of our law, but the following example helps demonstrate its distinctive 
features. The issues that I address below—what is property and what is the 
significance of the various property institutions constructed by law—raise 
 
101 LLEWELLYN, The Current Recapture of the Grand Tradition, in JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM 
IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 217. 
102 Id. at 219-20; see also Oliphant, supra note 30, at 73-74, 159 (discussing the impact of a multitude 
of writs and greater definiteness of pleadings in earlier English law on judges). 
103 See generally DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at pts one 
& three; Todd D. Rakoff, The Implied Terms of Contracts: Of ‘Default Rules’ and ‘Situation Sense’ 
(concluding that judges should consciously and methodically model a social and legal situation in 
reaching a workable and fair resolution), in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 191, 
219, 222, 225 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995). Realists do not ignore the downside 
of categories that are too small, namely, that there may be too many of them and that litigation 
will simply become about which of the multiple of small categories each case fits into. This short 
Article does not offer any meta-theory of the optimal size of doctrinal categories. My modest goal 
is to explain why Realists argue for smaller categories than we currently employ based on a 
pragmatic (and somewhat impressionistic) judgment, which attempts to balance all these 
considerations.  
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complicated questions, which I discuss at some length elsewhere.104 Drawing 
on these accounts, I hope to highlight the contribution of the realist conception 
of legal categorization in my answers to these perennial questions. 
Although the bundle-of-sticks conception of property has been regarded 
as the conventional wisdom,105 several leading property scholars have 
recently resurrected Blackstone’s conception of property as “sole and 
despotic dominion.”106 Relying on the implausibility of the nominalistic 
understanding of property as formless and open to ad hoc judicial adjustments, 
these theorists insist that although property does not always and necessarily 
entail unqualified dominion, “the right of the owner to act as the exclusive 
gatekeeper of the owned thing” is “the differentiating feature of a system of 
property.”107 
The structurally pluralistic account of property I have developed in  
recent years begins with the observation that, rather than a uniform bulwark 
of independence, property manifests itself in law in a much more nuanced, 
contextualized, and multifaceted way. Property law is divided into different 
institutions that reflect distinct types of human interaction with respect to 
given categories of resources. Some property institutions, such as fee simple 
absolute, govern arm’s length relationships between strangers (or market 
transactors) and are accordingly structured along the lines of the Blackstonian 
conception of property: they are atomistic and competitive and vindicate 
people’s negative liberty. Other property institutions, such as marital 
property, deal with intimate relationships and are therefore dominated by a 
much more communitarian view of property in which ownership is a locus 
of sharing. Finally, many other property institutions governing relationships 
between people who are neither strangers nor intimates, such as landlords, 
tenants, neighbors, co-owners, and members of the same local community, 
lie somewhere along the spectrum between atomistic and communitarian 
norms. In all these cases, both autonomy and community are implicated, 
and ownership thus implies both rights and responsibilities. 
Structural pluralism takes the heterogeneity of our existing property 
doctrines seriously. While conceding that there is some value in looking for 
 
104 See generally DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15; Hanoch 
Dagan, Inside Property, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2013); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in 
Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409 (2012). 
105 RESTATEMENT (F IRST) OF PROP. intro., §§ 1–5 (1936) (clarifying the scope of property 
to include “legal relations between persons with respect to a thing”). 
106 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
107 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1850 (2007); see also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997) (stating 
that the right to property should be conceived as the right of exclusive use).  
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a rather thin common denominator among the myriad of legal doctrines 
covered by the wholesale category of property, it insists that such a common 
denominator is not robust enough to explain the existing doctrines or 
determinative enough to provide significant guidance concerning their 
evaluation or development. Conceptualizing the right to exclude as the core 
of property marginalizes or possibly even undermines two significant 
constitutive characteristics of property: governance and inclusion. Property 
law is often shaped by a wide range of sophisticated governance regimes 
aiming to facilitate various forms of interpersonal relationships (such as the 
law of waste, landlord–tenant law, trust law, and the law of common-interest 
communities). Moreover, examining the more precise scope of owners’ right 
to exclude shows that inclusion is sometimes inherent in property: non-owners’ 
rights to entry in important categories of property cases (for example, the 
law of public accommodations, the copyright doctrine of fair use, and the 
law of fair housing, notably in the contexts of common-interest communities 
law and landlord–tenant law) are indispensable characteristics of the 
property institution under examination. 
Accordingly, a structurally pluralistic conception of property understands 
it as an umbrella for a limited and standardized set of property institutions, 
which serve as important default frameworks of interpersonal interaction. 
All these property institutions—the doctrinal categories to which we should 
pay most of our attention—mediate the relationship between owners and 
non-owners regarding a resource. In all property institutions, owners have 
some rights to exclude others. This common denominator of exclusion 
derives from the role of property in vindicating people’s independence. 
Alongside this important property value, however, other values also play 
crucial roles in shaping property institutions. Property also can, and does, 
serve our commitments to personhood, desert, aggregate welfare, social 
responsibility, and distributive justice. Property institutions offer differing 
configurations of entitlements that constitute the contents of an owner’s 
rights vis-à-vis others, or a certain type of others, with respect to a given 
resource.  
The particular configuration of these entitlements is by no means arbitrary 
or random. Rather, it is, at least at its best, determined by the character of 
the property institution at issue, namely by its unique balance of property 
values. These values both construct and reflect the ideal ways in which 
people interact in a given category of social contexts, such as market, 
community, and family, and with respect to a given category of resources, 
such as land, chattels, copyright, and patents. The ongoing process of 
reshaping property as institutions is usually addressed with an appropriate 
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degree of caution. And yet, the possibility of repackaging allows lawyers and 
judges, in those moments of “jurisprudence of ends,” to further develop 
existing property forms by accentuating their normative desirability while 
remaining attuned to their social context. 
Property relations mediate some of our most cooperative human interac-
tions as spouses, partners, members of local communities, and so forth. 
Rather than imposing the impersonal norms of the market governing the fee 
simple absolute on these divergent spheres, property law ideally facilitates 
their flourishing by supplying robust default mechanisms, particularly 
antiopportunistic devices, befitting their animating underlying principles. 
Thus, unlike the Blackstonian view, the structurally pluralistic construct 
recognizes the significant role that our social values play in our conception 
of property. Each of our property institutions, as noted, reflects a specific 
set of values to be served by its constitutive rules in one subset of social life. 
Both the existing categories and their underlying animating principles can 
become subject to debate and reform, so that some institutions may fade 
away while new ones emerge and yet others change their character or split. 
But at any given moment, each such institution consolidates people’s 
expectations regarding a core type of human relationships so that they can 
anticipate developments when entering, for instance, a common interest 
community, or marriage, or invading other people’s rights in a specific form 
of intellectual property. Thus, a set of fairly precise rules or informative, as 
opposed to open-ended, standards govern each of these property institutions, 
enabling people to predict the consequences of future contingencies and to 
plan their lives accordingly. Furthermore, our property institutions also 
serve as means for expressing normative ideals of law for these types of 
human interaction.108 In this way, structural pluralism obeys the Legal 
Realist prescription of curbing law’s power. By opening up alternatives, it 
allows individuals to navigate their own course, bypassing certain legal 
prescriptions and avoiding their implications, as well as the power of those 
who have issued them—without neglecting or undermining law’s normativity.  
Trying to impose a uniform understanding of property on such a diverse 
set of property institutions is not only misleading, but also unfortunate, 
because property’s structural pluralism enables diverse forms of the good to 
flourish. Only a sufficiently heterogeneous property law, alongside an 
 
108 The doctrinal home of this feature of property law is, of course, the numerus clausus prin-
ciple. While it has no direct parallel in contract law, that body of law also complies to a significant 
degree with the injunctions of structural pluralism. See generally HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL A. 
HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACT (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that contract law 
promotes not only the familiar freedom to bargain for terms within a contract, but also the 
neglected freedom to choose from among contract types). 
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attendant commitment to freedom of contract regarding property rules, 
facilitates the coexistence of a diverse set of social institutions crucial for 
our autonomy. We should thus conceptualize property in a way that  
celebrates the existing multiplicity of property law, guiding its expansion to 
include a repertoire of sufficiently distinct institutions in all relevant 
spheres of human activity. Indeed, as long as the boundaries between these 
multiple property institutions are open and as long as nonabusive navigation 
within this diverse system is a matter of individual choice, commitment to 
personal autonomy does not necessitate the hegemony of the fee simple 
absolute. Nor does this commitment undermine the value of other, more 
communitarian or utilitarian property institutions. The eradication or 
marginalization of the fee simple absolute would have entailed an excessive 
restriction of liberty, because it would have erased the option of private 
sovereignty and thus eliminated the option of retreat into one’s own safe 
haven. But as long as this property institution remains a viable alternative, 
the availability of several different, but equally valuable and obtainable, 
proprietary frameworks of interpersonal interaction makes autonomy more, 
not less, meaningful.  
Structural pluralism is likely to be more compatible with the rule of law 
than its monistic counterpart due to its acknowledgement of multiple 
categories. By making options available rather than channeling everyone to 
the one possibility privileged by law, a structurally pluralistic property law 
constrains the power of lawmakers. Moreover, resorting to relatively small 
categories (property institutions) implies that where bright line rules cannot 
adequately serve as guides for action, standards can be informative (thus 
complying with the guidance prescription of the rule of law), since they 
reflect the robust animating principle of the pertinent property institution, 
rather than the thin common denominator of property writ large. 
This pluralist conception of property does not discount the significance 
of property as a doctrinal category. The similarities among the various 
property institutions justify treating them as the subject matter of unified 
scholarly treatments. Often, however, these similarities merely mean that 
studying the various institutions of property law requires us to ask similar 
questions, such as the following: What is the appropriate scope of an 
owner’s exclusion? Or, what is the optimal governance regime for this 
property institution? At times, these commonalities imply some overlap in 
the pertinent values that affect the regulative principles of these diverse 
institutions such as the personhood concerns that inform a certain subset of 
property institutions, while utility is significant in another subset. These 
similarities ensure that reflecting on the variety of property institutions is 
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likely to yield some useful cross-fertilization. They do imply, then, that 
property may well be a useful category of thinking. However, they do not 
imply the type of normative coherence needed to justify making membership 
in property law a reason for any concrete prescriptive consequence. In other 
words, they do not justify treating property as a singular category for 
decisionmaking purposes.  
CONCLUSION 
I conclude with a brief reflection on the institutional implications of my 
claims. This Article demonstrated how the realist conception of law does 
not threaten conventional understandings of legal professionalism.109 
Doctrinalism is alive because lawyers’ convergent background understandings 
renders it robust enough for the daily practice of law. But by insisting that 
predictability is intrinsic to the broader social practice of law rather than to 
doctrine, Realists discredit the law–doctrine equation, revealing the law’s 
inherent potential dynamism.  
This dynamism makes room for the realist celebration of law’s  
embeddedness in the social sciences and the humanities. It implies that some 
legal actors—such as legislators and appellate judges—should occasionally use 
new social developments and cases as triggers for an ongoing refinement of 
the law and as opportunities for revisiting the normative viability of our 
existing doctrines and reexamining the adequacy of their categorization. 
This understanding of law bears even more significant implications for legal 
scholarship, because critical reflection is its raison d’être as an academic 
discipline. It implies that the realist “demotion” of purely doctrinal analysis 
“to lesser status within the modern U.S. legal academy”110 is appropriate. 
Realists reject the popular idea that legal theory is merely the application of 
the methods of other disciplines to the data of law.111 Yet, their devastating 
critique of the reduction of law to doctrine suggests that doctrinal inquiry 
cannot be the core of law as an academic discipline. Against these two 
disappointing alternatives and in line with their conception of law, Realists 
claim that there are two interconnected aspects of legal theory’s distinct 
character, which is the core identifier of law as an academic discipline: the 
 
109 Cf. J.E. Penner, Decent Burial for Dead Concepts, 58 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 313, 314 
(2010) (arguing that lawyers are engaged in critical thinking, not theorizing). 
110 Goldberg, supra note 1, at 1656. 
111 See Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962–1987, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 761, 779 (1987) (defining legal theory as “the study of the law . . . ‘from the 
outside,’ using the methods of scientific and humanistic inquiry to enlarge our knowledge of the 
legal system”). 
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attention it gives to law as a set of coercive normative institutions and its 
relentless effort to incorporate and synthesize the lessons of other disciplines 
about law.112 
 
112 See Hanoch Dagan, Law as an Academic Discipline, in STATELESS LAW 43 (Shauna Van 
Praagh & Helge Dedek eds., 2015). 
